Cooperative banks are an important, and growing, part of many financial systems. The paper analyzes empirically the role of cooperative banks in financial stability. Contrary to some suggestions in the literature, we find that cooperative banks are more stable than commercial banks. This finding is due to much lower volatility of the cooperative banks' returns, which more than offsets their lower profitability and capitalization. We argue that this lower variability of returns is most likely due to cooperative banks' ability to use customer surplus as a cushion in weaker periods. We also find that in systems with a high presence of cooperative banks, commercial banks are less stable than they would be otherwise. JEL Classification Numbers: G21, P13
I. MOTIVATION AND LITERATURE OVERVIEW
Cooperative (mutual) banks are an important part of many financial systems.
2 In a number of countries, they are among the largest financial institutions when considered as a group. Moreover, the share of cooperative banks has been increasing in recent years; in the sample of banks in advanced economies and emerging markets analyzed in this paper, the market share of cooperative banks in terms of total banking sector assets increased from about 9 percent in mid-1990s to about 14 percent in 2004.
Cooperative banks are particularly numerous and large in Europe. The five largest cooperative banks in the European Union (EU) rank among the EU's top 25 banking groups in terms of consolidated equity. Reflecting the cooperative banks' focus on retail banking, their market share in retail business is even more substantial: for example, 5 EU member countries have more than 40 percent market share of cooperative banks in terms of branch networks ( Figure 1 ). In non-European advanced economies and emerging markets, the share of cooperative banks is generally lower, but there are several countries where they play a non-negligible role. The importance of cooperative banks-and in particular the implications of their specific nature for financial stability-has not yet received appropriate attention in the empirical literature. The literature devotes disproportionately little attention to cooperative banks in comparison with commercial banks, smaller than would correspond, for example, to their market share. For example, only about 0.1 percent of all banking-related entries in EconLit, a major database of economic research, relates to cooperative banking. 3 This contrasts with the share of cooperative banks, which account on average for about 10 percent of banking system assets in advanced economies and emerging markets, reaching as much as 30 percent in some countries in terms of assets (and even more in terms of branches-see Figure 1 ). Most of the EconLit entries devoted to cooperative banks deal with specific country cases or with issues relating to efficiency rather than those relating financial stability. For example, Brunner and others (2004) analyze revenue and cost efficiency of cooperative banks in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain and find that cooperative banks are not less effective at managing revenues and costs than commercial banks.
The regulatory framework, including the recent amendments, is also generally designed with commercial banks in mind. For example, the third pillar of the New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II)-which relies on extensive disclosure to ensure that banks are subject to market discipline-has a significantly reduced effectiveness in the case of cooperative banks (Fonteyne, 2006) . Cooperatives' disclosure practices and requirements are substantially below those of commercial banks, especially listed ones. Even if disclosure were adequate, there are rarely markets that can exert effective disciplining pressure. Shareholder pressure cannot be relied upon and cooperatives do not rely much on interbank markets or debt issuance as sources of funds. Finally, loyal and insured retail depositors are not likely to exert an effective market disciplining effect either at an early enough stage.
Macroprudential work on financial systems, such as the IMF's Financial System Stability Assessment reports (FSSAs), Article IV staff reports, and the Global Financial Stability Report, and reports on financial stability published by central banks (for a survey, see Čihák, 2006) pay relatively little attention to cooperative banks. Fonteyne (2006) cites the FSSAs for France and Germany as two reports that devoted some attention to cooperative banks; however, the references to cooperative banks in those reports focused on mutual support and deposit insurance mechanisms, efficiency, and financial sector consolidation issues, rather than on financial stability implications.
higher fragility of financial systems, Goodhart (2004) interprets this result as perhaps indicating that the presence of any non-profit-maximizing banking entities may make financial systems more fragile.
Goodhart does not elaborate on the underlying mechanism of this relationship between presence of non-profit-maximizing entities and financial stability, but possible mechanisms are not difficult to envision in the case of cooperative banks. Cooperative banks' objective is not to maximize profits, but rather their members' consumer surplus. This is in some cases complemented by additional objectives that seek to contribute to the well-being of stakeholders other than member-consumers, such as employees. If a cooperative bank's pursuit of objectives other than profit maximization results in very low profitability, its balance sheet risks growing faster than its capital, leading to deteriorating solvency. If cooperative banks accept a lower level of profitability as the price to pay for delivering financial services at below-market prices to retail clients, they may pull down the profitability of the entire banking system, with negative repercussions for other banks' soundness.
The literature's verdict on cooperative banks' role in financial stability is less than clear. Several papers suggest that cooperative banks may have more difficulties adjusting to adverse circumstances and changing risks. For example, Brunner and others (2004) note that the Swedish cooperative banking sector did not survive the crisis of the early 1990s in a cooperative form, as the need to restore capital was a major factor in the decision to demutualize. Fonteyne (2006) suggests that cooperative banks may be more vulnerable to shocks in credit quality and interest rates, because they are more focused on traditional financial intermediation than other institutions, and therefore have higher exposures to credit and interest rate risk. At the same time, several studies suggest that cooperative banks have generally lower incentives to take on risks. For example, Hansmann (1996) and Chaddad and Cook (2004) find, for data from the United States, that mutual financial institutions tend to adopt less risky strategies than demutualized ones.
Whether cooperative banks have a generally positive or negative impact on financial stability therefore remains an empirical question. We address this question by analyzing bank-bybank data for major advanced economies and emerging markets. We examine two related issues:
• Cooperative banks' soundness and resilience to stress. We test the hypothesis that cooperative banks are relatively weaker in responding to stress, because of the features of their business model.
• Cooperative banks' impact on other banks. We test the hypothesis that the presence of cooperative banks lowers systemic stability. As explained, this may be for example because the cooperative banks use their lower cost of capital to pursue aggressive expansion plans that may weaken other financial institutions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II introduces the data and variables used in the paper (characterized in more detail in Appendix I), and presents the estimation methodology. Section III presents the empirical results. Section IV sums up the conclusions, and suggests topics for further research.
II. DATA AND METHODOLOGY

A. Data
Our calculations are based on individual bank data drawn from the BankScope database, provided by Bureau van Dijk. We use data on all commercial, cooperative, and savings banks in the database from 29 major advanced economies and emerging markets that are members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 4 In total, we have data on 16,577 banks from 1994 to 2004, comprising 11,090 commercial banks, 3,072 cooperative banks, and 2,415 savings banks.
Several general issues relating to the BankScope data need to be mentioned. First, the database, while being the most comprehensive commercially available database of banking sector data, is not exhaustive. Coverage varies from country to country; for most countries in our sample, the BankScope data cover 80-90 percent of the banking systems in terms of total assets, and the coverage of cooperative banks is lower than of commercial banks (in particular, BankScope contains only a small number of cooperative banks in the United States). 5 However, the coverage of our paper is still higher than in most banking studies (and in particular studies that focus on banks with particular features, such as large banks or banks that are listed on stock market), and even for cooperative banks our sample captures a majority in terms of total assets. We therefore believe the sample is comprehensive enough to make reliable inferences.
Second, BankScope gives the specialization (status) of a given bank in our sample (commercial, cooperative, and savings) in the current year. Therefore, it is for instance likely that the commercial bank subset contains some banks that have been cooperative or savings banks in earlier periods. Where information was available, we changed the status of a given bank. For example, France was subject to a banking reform in June 1999 in which all savings banks were converted into cooperative banks. The Alliance & Leicester (United Kingdom) as well as First National (Ireland) Building Societies were demutualized and were stock market listed in 1997 and 1998, respectively. But given the large number of banks in our sample, it was not possible to individually check potential changes in specialization over time. Overall, we do not think that this limitation of our BankScope dataset will bias the results.
Third, our analysis is based on unconsolidated bank statements. Ideally, we would have opted for consolidated statements whereby the parent company integrates the statements of its subsidiaries. However, given that about 90 percent of BankScope observations for the selected countries and periods are based on unconsolidated data, we focus on results based on unconsolidated data. Nonetheless, we have also performed the same calculations with consolidated data, and obtained very similar results (available upon request).
In addition to the bank-by-bank data, we also use a number of macroeconomic and other system-wide indicators. Those are described in more detail in Appendix I.
B. Measuring Bank Stability
Our primary dependent variable is the z-score as a measure of individual bank risk. The zscore has become a popular measure of bank soundness (see, e.g., Boyd and Runkle (1993) , Maechler, Mitra, and Worrell (2005) , Beck and Laeven (2006) , Laeven and Levine (2006) , and Mercieca, Schaeck, and Wolfe (forthcoming)). Its popularity stems from the fact that it is directly related to the probability of a bank's insolvency, i.e. the probability that the value of its assets becomes lower than the value of the debt. The z-score can be summarized as z≡(k+µ)/σ, where k is equity capital as percent of assets, µ is average after-tax return as percent on assets, and σ is standard deviation of the after-tax return on assets, as a proxy for return volatility. The z-score measures the number of standard deviations a return realization has to fall in order to deplete equity, under the assumption of normality of banks' returns. A higher z-score corresponds to a lower upper bound of insolvency risk-a higher z-score therefore implies a lower probability of insolvency risk. 6 One issue relating to the use of z-scores for analyzing cooperative banks is whether the zscores are a fair measure of soundness across different groups of institutions, in particular given that cooperative banks are much less focused on returns and profitability than commercial banks. We think that the z-score is an objective measure, as all banks (cooperative, commercial, and savings), face the same risk of insolvency in case they run out of capital. This is exactly the risk captured by the z-score, which has the same methodology for any type of bank. If an institution "chooses" to have lower risk-adjusted returns, it can still have the same or higher z-score if it has a higher capitalization.
C. Methodology
We start by two preliminary steps: a decomposition of observed differences in z-scores into the underlying factors (capitalization, returns, and volatility of returns), and a calculation of correlation coefficients between z-scores and other variables of interest.
The main part of our approach is to test the two hypotheses outlined in the Introduction (Section I) using regressions of z-scores on a number of explanatory variables. We estimate a general class of panel models of the form
where the dependent variable is the z-score for bank i, country j, and time t; is a vector of bank-specific variables; contains time-varying banking industry-specific variables in country j; and are the type of banks and the interaction between the type and some of the industry-specific variables; , , and are vectors of macroeconomic variables, country, and yearly dummy variables, respectively; and
To distinguish the impact of bank type on the z-score, we include two dummy variables. The first dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the bank in question is a commercial bank, and 0 otherwise; the second one takes the value of 1 for savings banks, and 0 otherwise. If cooperative banks are relatively weaker than commercial (or savings) banks, the first (second) dummy variable would have a positive sign in the regression explaining z-scores.
At the systemic (country) level, we want to examine cooperative banks' impact on other banks and the hypothesis that the presence of cooperative banks lowers systemic stability. For this reason, we have calculated the market share of cooperative banks by assets for each year and country and interacted it with the commercial bank dummy. For example, a negative sign for the interaction of the cooperative banks' market share and the commercial bank dummy would indicate a decrease in commercial banks' stability (in their z-scores).
In addition to these key variables of interest, the regression includes a number of other control variables, both on individual bank level and on country level. Appendix I provides a description of the variables. To control for bank-level differences in bank size, asset composition, and cost efficiency, we include the bank's asset size in US$ billion, loans over assets, and the cost-income ratio. Also, to control for differences in structure of banks' income, we calculate a measure of income diversity that follows Laeven and Levine (2005) .
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The variable measures the degree to which banks diversify from traditional lending activities (those generating net interest income) to other activities. To further capture differences of cooperative banks in their business orientation, we interact the income diversity variable with the cooperative bank dummy. Controlling for these variables is important because there are differences in these variables between cooperative banks and the other groups. For example, commercial banks are on average larger than cooperative banks throughout the sample period. Similarly, the asset size of cooperatives is less volatile than for commercial banks but significantly more volatile than for savings banks. We want to adjust for the differences in these variables to ensure that we capture the "pure" impact of the bank's legal form (commercial, cooperative, or savings) on stability. 8 On the country level, we include a number of variables that take on the same value for all banks in a given country. In particular, we adjust for the impact of the macroeconomic cycle by including a number of macroeconomic variables (GDP growth rate, inflation, the real long-term interest rate, and exchange rate appreciation). To account for possible crosscountry variation in financial stability caused by differences in market concentration, we include the Herfindahl index, defined as the sum of squared market shares (in terms of total assets) of all banks in the country. In separate regressions, we also account for the quality of corporate governance in a country, using a popular indicator by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005) . The authors provide 6 governance measures (voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption). We average the 6 measures across the available years (2004, 2002, 2000, 1998, and 1996) into one single index per country.
The governance indicator will capture cross-country differences in institutional developments that might have an effect on banking risk. All bank-specific and macroeconomic variables, the Herfindahl index, and the cooperatives' market share and its interaction with the commercial bank dummy are lagged to capture possible past effects of these variables on the banks' individual risk. We also test for the robustness of the lagged effects by restricting the explanatory variables to contemporaneous effects.
Across the whole sample, most observations of the z-score are found in the 20-80 range; however, there are some extreme observations, resulting in the sample range being from -81 to 14,811 with an average of 57. It is therefore sensible to eliminate observations at the extreme end of the z-score distribution. To eliminate the outliers, we delete the 1 st and 99 th percentile from the distribution of the z-score.
To assess the robustness of the results with respect to the selected sample, we estimate the same regression for different country samples, and different bank size samples. We start with the widest sample that includes all OECD countries (except Slovakia, for which the BankScope contains no data on cooperative banks). We then estimate the same regression for the Euro area (EU12), 10 and for countries where the cooperatives' market share exceeds 5 percent in our sample (Coop5).
11 As regards the robustness with respect to bank size, we estimate the regressions separately for large and small banks.
We also test the robustness of our results with respect to the estimation methods. We start by pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) and fixed effects estimates, followed by a robust estimation technique, and a quantile regression. The robust estimation technique assigns, through an iterative process, lower weights to observations with large residuals, thereby making the estimation less sensitive to outliers. The quantile regression allows to address the question whether the factors that cause high fragility are systematically different from the factors that cause medium or low fragility.
III. RESULTS
A. Decomposition of Z-scores and Correlation Analysis
A preliminary analysis shows that the cooperative banks' z-scores are on average significantly higher than for commercial banks (and slightly, but insignificantly, higher than for savings banks), suggesting that cooperative banks are more stable than commercial banks. Interestingly, this is not because of capitalization or profitability--those two are on average weaker for cooperative banks than for commercial banks. The result is driven by the fact that the cooperative banks' standard deviation of returns is much lower, resulting in the high zscore (Tables 1 and 2 ).
Why do we find the low volatility of returns over time in cooperative banks? A plausible explanation of this result is that the cooperative banks use the customer surplus as a first line of defense in weaker times. Cooperative banks pass on an important part of their returns to customers in the form of surplus. Indeed, their stated objective is not maximization of profits, but rather maximization of the consumer surplus. This leaves the cooperative banks with relatively low average return ratios in normal years. However, in weaker years, they are able to extract some of the consumer surplus, thereby mitigating the negative impact of stress on returns. We are therefore observing a lower variability of returns in cooperative banks than in commercial banks (and about the same as in savings banks).
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These calculations suggest that the consumer surplus might be viewed as the first line of defense for cooperative banks, in a similar way as profits are the first line of defense for commercial banks. However, there are some important differences. First, consumer surplus is a very complex concept to measure. We are not able to observe consumers' surplus on a consistent basis; even though we can make inferences about it from the pattern of returns. Second, while undistributed profits can be relatively easily used to replenish capital, extracting consumer surplus is one more step removed from capital and requires time.
To address the idea that cooperative banks are less able to raise capital in situations of stress, we have also examined volatility in cooperative banks' capitalization compared with commercial banks' capitalization (even though volatility in capitalization is not a part of the z-score calculation). However, the results only confirm our findings about z-scores: cooperative banks also have a significantly lower volatility of capitalization.
The finding that cooperative banks have higher z-scores is novel, but not inconsistent with the existing literature. The empirical papers on the subject note that cooperative banks have lower reported returns, but they find no compelling evidence that the lower returns would be due to a less effective management of revenues and costs than in commercial banks (e.g., Brunner and others (2004) , and Altunbas, Evans, and Molyneux (2001)).
13 If the lower returns were due to inefficiencies in cooperative banks' operation, then it would be difficult to argue that there are cushions that can be used in weak times. However, the finding that cooperative banks have lower returns with the same efficiency suggest that there are cushions that can be used in situation of stress, an idea that is consistent with our finding. 14 To assess the robustness of our findings, we have also tried some alternatives to the standard definition of the z-score (Table 3 ). The underlying idea behind these alternative approaches (which have to our knowledge not yet been discussed in the literature) is that the standard deviation underlying the z-score gives only a part of the information about the behavior of zscores. In particular, when assessing stability, we are much more interested in the downward spikes in ROAs (and z-scores) than in the upticks. Table 3 has four panels, corresponding to four alternative variables that we have investigated, in particular:
• We have defined downward (upward) volatility of ROA as the sample average of the difference between the bank-specific ROA per year and its mean of ROA if the ROA is below (above) the bank-specific mean. Table 3 indicates that both downward and upward volatility of ROA are higher for commercial banks than for cooperative and savings banks. Comparing the absolute values within each bank type shows that the commercial banks' downward volatility of ROA is higher than its upward volatility. This finding does not hold for cooperative and savings banks.
• Similarly, we have defined the downward (upward) volatility of the z-scores as the sample average of the difference between the bank-specific z-score per year and its mean of the z-score if the z-score is below (above) the bank-specific mean. We cannot observe any statistical difference in the downward (upward) volatility of the z-scores.
• Furthermore, the downward (upward) volatility of the capitalization is defined as the sample average of the difference between the bank-specific equity-to-assets ratio per year and its mean of the capitalization if the equity-to-assets ratio is below (above) the bankspecific mean. The downward (upward) volatility of capitalization is lower for cooperatives than for commercial and savings banks.
• Commercial banks' z-scores have a higher frequency in the lower distribution of the zscores than cooperative and savings banks. This supports the previous results of lower average z-scores for commercial banks during the sample period.
Overall, the above robustness checks support the findings for the simple z-scores. 15 To further assess the robustness of our findings, we can also look at measures of financial soundness that are alternative to the z-scores. An obvious alternative are ratings by rating agencies. Table 4 presents a distribution of long-term credit ratings by the Fitch Ratings for cooperative banks and commercial banks in the 29 advanced economies and emerging markets. The overall conclusion is that at least on the first look there does not seem to be a major difference between the ratings for cooperative banks and commercial banks. For both groups, for example, about 90 percent of institutions have investment grade long-term credit rating (defined as BBB-or higher). It should be noted, however, that the distribution of ratings for cooperative banks is highly influenced by the ratings for German cooperative banks, all of which were given the same (A+) rating. This limits the usefulness of ratings for further, econometric analysis. In the next section, we will therefore focus on the z-scores.
Before discussing the regression results, we show some simple correlation coefficients between the z-score and selected key variables in Table 5 . Here, we differentiate between all the banks in the sample and large (small) banks that have assets larger (smaller) than US$1 billion. Similar to the findings from the decomposition of the z-score in Table 1 , commercial banks tend to have lower z-scores than cooperative and savings banks in all model specifications. Also, both the cooperative bank dummy and the z-score are positively correlated across the different samples.
While there is no evidence that the cooperative market share per country and year is negatively correlated with the z-scores of all commercial, cooperative and savings banks, we do find a significantly negative correlation between the z-scores and the interaction term of the share of cooperatives and commercial bank dummy in all models as hypothesized previously. A stronger cooperative sector is associated with higher commercial banks' risk. Since correlation findings do not necessarily reflect causal relationships, we now turn to the panel regressions. Table 6 presents pooled OLS and fixed effects estimates for the z-scores in the OECD countries, Euro zone (EU12), and the countries where the cooperatives' market share exceeds 5 percent (Coop5). 16 All panel regressions include clustered standard errors (by bank), year and country dummy variables. Our main focus in discussing the results is on the two hypotheses outlined in the introduction.
B. Regression Analysis
All the pooled OLS regressions provide strong evidence that commercial and savings banks have lower z-scores than cooperative banks, that is, they appear more likely to become insolvent than cooperative banks. This is in line with the previous findings from the decomposition of the z-score.
Looking at the cooperative banks' impact on other banks, we find that a higher market share of the cooperative banks has a significantly negative effect on commercial banks' risk in the pooled OLS model for OECD countries as well as in the fixed effects model for the EU12 and Coop5 sub-samples. This is consistent with the hypothesis that a higher presence of notprofit-maximizing cooperative banks could pull down the soundness of commercial banks. This could be because cooperative banks "over-pay" for deposits or "under-charge" for assets, or because the commercial banks get crowded out of the retail market and have to turn to markets that are more volatile.
These two impacts of cooperative banks on z-scores capture the "pure" impact of bank's cooperative nature on stability, after adjusting for other characteristics that are different among banks. In particular, we find that larger banks tend to have lower z-scores, perhaps because they engage in riskier activities than smaller banks (and reflecting a relatively higher risk aversion of small banks). Also, banks with higher loan-to-asset ratios tend to be riskier (even though this result is valid only for the OECD sample as a whole, but not necessarily in the EU12 and Coop5 sub-samples). Banks with higher loan portfolios on their balance sheets relative to their total assets might be more likely to experience problems with nonperforming loans and thus be riskier. Finally, very inefficient banks in terms of their cost-toincome ratio might be less likely to cover their costs when they are hit by adverse shocks so they tend to be riskier. The evidence on the effect of bank concentration on individual bank risk is mixed and unclear in the pooled OLS and fixed effects regressions.
The results from the income diversity variable and its interaction with the cooperative bank dummy support the above hypothesis. Overall, an increase in diversity (which could be interpreted as less focus on the traditional lending business) tends in general to increase banks' risk; however, cooperative banks tend to become more stable if they diversify their activities. This results can be explained by the fact that commercial banks are about 30-40 percent more diversified than cooperative banks (both in the whole OECD sample and the EU12 and Coop5 sub-samples). Because of their stronger focus on the lending (retail) business, cooperative banks' stability improves from an increase in diversification of their activities; in contrast, a further move away from retail business in commercial banks, which have already a relatively higher share of other (wholesale) activities, results in decreasing stability (z-scores).
To examine in more detail the hypothesis that cooperative banks over-pay for deposits or under-charge for loans, we have calculated the implicit deposit and lending rates for the commercial and cooperative banks, defining the implicit deposit rate as total interest rate expenses over deposits and the lending rate as interest rate income over loans. Based on this calculation, there is no significant difference for deposit rates, but there is some evidence that cooperative banks charge lower lending rates than commercial banks (9.4 percent compared with 13.2 percent). Also, the effect of an increased presence of cooperative banks per country and year has on average a positive effect on the z-scores of all the commercial, cooperative, and savings banks per country and year. Here, unlike the results from the previously discussed interaction terms we cannot differentiate the effects on commercial, cooperative, or savings banks, so by itself, the information value is rather limited. A stronger cooperative sector can have a different effect on commercial banks' risk than, say, cooperative banks' risk. Table 7 presents the OECD pooled regressions with the governance indicator constructed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005) . As expected, banks in countries with a higher level of institutional development are on average less risky than banks in countries which lack the same governance quality. From a comparison of table 6 and 7, the governance indicator does not have a significant impact on the estimated slope coefficients for the commercial and savings bank dummies, suggesting that cooperative banks are not more or less sensitive to governance problems than the other types of banks. However, this finding has to be taken with a grain of salt, because we use the overall quality of governance in the country as a proxy for corporate governance in the individual banks, on which there are unfortunately no direct cross-country data.
In addition to the full sample regressions, we also estimated models for large and small banks for purposes of sensitivity analyses.
17 Table 8 replicates the previous regressions on the OECD, EU12, and Coop5 countries only with large banks, defined as those that have assets larger than US$1 billion. The commercial bank dummy is significantly negative in the pooled OLS estimations (except the OECD sample). The previous result that a strong cooperative banking sector might weaken the commercial banking sector is strongly supported in the regressions with large banks for both the pooled OLS and fixed effects models. Table 9 gives the model findings for the small banks (those with assets below US$1 billion). Small commercial banks tend to be riskier than small cooperative banks but there is no substantial evidence that an increase in the cooperative market share has a consistently and significantly negative effect on the smaller commercial banks' individual risk. Therefore, it appears that the result in the full sample model was predominantly driven by the large banks. It could be the case that smaller commercial banks are more specialized or not subject to the same competition with cooperative banks than larger commercial banks are.
As a further sensitivity test, we estimated the models with the robust estimation technique, which assigns lower weights to observations with large residuals, to avoid the impact of outliers (Beck, Cull, and Jerome, 2005) . The results in Table 10 support the main conclusion from the previous discussion. The interaction term between the share of cooperatives and commercial bank dummy is significantly negative in almost all robust model specifications. Finally, restricting the explanatory variables to only contemporaneous effects does not change the main findings (tables available upon request).
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To address the question whether the factors that cause high fragility are systematically different from the factors that cause medium or low fragility, we adopt quantile regression techniques. Table 11 gives the regression results at the 25, 50, and 75 percent quantile of the OECD, EU12, and Coop5 countries. The model setup is the same as for the full sample with the same variables included and the same outliers excluded (1 st and 99 th percentile of the distribution of the z-score).
The signs of the variables estimated in the quantile regression are consistent with the signs obtained earlier (except for the loan to asset ratio). Based on the coefficients of the commercial bank dummy, the gap between the z-scores of commercial and cooperative banks tends to widen with the quantiles in the OECD, EU12, and Coop5 models, which suggests that the distribution of z-scores in cooperatives is much more skewed to the right: if one compares strong cooperative banks and strong commercial banks, the difference in z-scores is much bigger than for weak cooperative banks and weak commercial banks. A similar conclusion is valid also for the comparison of cooperative banks and savings banks, even though the differences in their z-scores are generally smaller.
Upon inspecting the interaction term between the cooperative share and commercial bank dummy, it appears from the coefficient magnitudes that an increased presence of cooperative banks per country and year has a larger negative effect on the weakest commercial banks than the strongest commercial banks. In other words, commercial banks that already have low z-scores suffer more from a stronger cooperative sector than commercial banks with higher z-scores.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND TOPICS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The findings in this paper indicate, somewhat surprisingly, that cooperative banks in advanced economies and emerging markets have higher z-scores than commercial banks, which suggests higher stability. This finding is due to much lower volatility of the cooperative banks' returns, which offsets their relatively lower profitability and capitalization. This finding is quite robust with respect to various modifications in the measurement of volatility and z-scores. We argue that this observed lower variability of returns, and therefore the higher z-scores, are most likely caused by the fact that cooperative banks in normal times pass on most of their returns to customers, but are able to recoup that surplus in weaker periods. To some extent, this result can also reflect the mutual support mechanisms that many cooperative banks have created.
At the same time, our econometric estimates suggest that a higher presence of cooperative banks in an advanced economy or an emerging market tends to significantly decrease the zscores of commercial banks in the same financial system. This finding is consistent with Goodhart's (2004) hypothesis that the presence of non-profit-maximizing entities in a financial system can weaken its stability. The finding can be explained by the fact that a higher cooperative bank presence means less space for commercial banks in the retail market and therefore their greater reliance on less stable revenue sources such as corporate banking or investment banking.
The overall impact of a higher presence of cooperative banks on banking sector stability is slightly positive on average but insignificant in some specifications. This is a reflection of the fact that the direct effect of higher z-scores in cooperative banks is largely offset by the negative impact of a higher cooperative bank presence on z-scores in commercial banks.
When interpreting the results, we need to bear in mind some caveats of the z-score such as its reliance on accounting data and its focus on capital and profits rather than, say, liquidity or asset quality. As a robustness test, we have therefore tried to include some possible alternatives to the z-scores, such as ratings. The available data suggest that the ratings of cooperative banks are not substantially worse than those for commercial banks; however, the bias of the ratings database towards one country (Germany) does not allow for a full-fledged cross-country analysis.
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Several issues, not addressed in this paper, could be analyzed in future research. One of them are corporate governance issues, discussed in more detail for example in Fonteyne (2006) . Cooperatives typically face corporate governance issues that are larger than, and in some cases absent from, commercial banks. Among them is the presence of an owner-less endowment since members of cooperatives are only invested with the notional value of their shares and have no right to the accumulated capital. Furthermore, there is a collective action problem which might lead to empire building by the management. BankScope and similar databases do not contain institution-specific data on the quality of the corporate governance, but with a more detailed database, perhaps on a smaller sample, it may be possible to analyze this issue.
Another possible issue for further research is the impact of networks on cooperative banks' stability. Cooperative banks can realize important benefits by forming networks, as it allows the pursuit of economies of scale and scope, and the provision of a safety net or mutual support mechanism. However, the more complex structure can also create new challenges for financial stability. For example, Desrochers and Fischer (2005) , in a cross-country survey on the level of integration of systems of financial cooperatives, note that lateral contracts between cooperative partners involve risks that counterparts will behave opportunistically to appropriate the rent generated by the alliance. Note: To eliminate outliers, the 1st and and 99th percentiles of the distribution of the downward (upward) volatility variables were excluded.
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As regards bank status (commercial, cooperative, and savings), we have used the information contained in BankScope as default, but where additional information was available (e.g., for France, United Kingdom, and Ireland), we changed the status of a given bank.
The data used in the analysis are based on unconsolidated bank statements, because about 90 percent of Bankscope observations for the selected countries and periods are based on unconsolidated data.
The following table describes the individual variables used in the paper and their sources.
Variable Description Source Z-score Defined as z≡(k+µ)/σ, where k is equity capital as percent of assets, µ is average return as percent on assets, and σ is standard deviation of return on assets as a proxy for return volatility. Measures the number of standard deviations a return realization has to fall in order to deplete equity, under the assumption of normality of banks' returns. 
